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Abstract 
 
This paper examines why fiscal policy is procyclical in 
developing as well as developed countries. We introduce the 
concept of fiscal transparency into a model of retrospective 
voting, in which a political agency problem between voters and 
politicians generates a procyclical bias in government 
spending. The introduction of fiscal transparency generates two 
new predictions: 1) the procyclical bias in fiscal policy arises 
only in good times; and 2) a higher degree of fiscal 
transparency reduces the bias in good times. We find solid 
empirical support for both predictions using data on both 
OECD countries and a broader set of countries. 
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1     Introduction 
Fiscal policy is often procyclical: cyclical increases in real income are often accompanied 
by increases in government spending and/or tax cuts.1 Such a policy may amplify fluctuations 
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in real output, thereby leading to prolonged recessions in bad times and inflationary pressures 
in good times. Moreover, a procyclical fiscal policy is in conflict with the tax smoothing 
principle (Barro [1979]), which prescribes that tax rates should be unrelated to business cycle 
fluctuations. Finally, a procyclical fiscal policy may lead to excessive volatility in private- 
and public consumption, thus violating the principle of consumption smoothing. Thus, most 
economists would agree with the view that a procyclical fiscal policy is a harmful policy that 
adds to macroeconomic instability. Nevertheless, procyclical fiscal policies occur frequently 
in reality. In this paper we provide economic theory as well as empirical evidence in an 
attempt to explain the occurrence of such procyclical policies. 
The empirical literature on the cyclicality of fiscal policy has found that fiscal policy is 
typically procyclical in developing countries, and especially Latin America.2 Gavin and 
Perotti (1997) suggest that procyclical fiscal policies in these countries arise because of 
binding borrowing constraints. According to their hypothesis, governments in developing 
countries are likely to become credit constrained in times of economic slowdown, which may 
force them to run a procyclical fiscal policy. Other authors, such as Tornell and Lane (1999), 
Talvi and Végh (2005) and Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008), have proposed political 
economy explanations of the occurrence of procyclical fiscal policies. 
The studies mentioned above take the view that fiscal policies in developed countries are 
typically acyclical or even countercyclical. However, a number of studies have found 
evidence of procyclicality in subcomponents of government spending and in overall 
discretionary government spending in developed countries (see for instance Hallerberg and 
Strauch (2002), Gali and Perotti (2003) and Lane (2003)). Few studies have attempted to 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 Following Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004), we define a procyclical fiscal policy as a policy where 
increases in real output lead to discretionary increases in spending and/or tax cuts. 
2 See for instance Gavin and Perotti (1997), Catão and Sutton (2002) or Talvi and Végh (2005). 
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explain this procyclical pattern. Battaglini and Coate (2008) present a real business cycle 
model in which elected representatives attempt to target public spending to their own home 
districts. Their model predicts that government spending increases in booms and decreases in 
recessions, while tax rates fall in booms and increase in recessions.  
The empirical analyses in this paper reveal an asymmetry in the reaction of fiscal policy to 
output fluctuations: fiscal policy is generally more procyclical in good times than in bad 
times, especially in developed countries. Other authors have also found such an asymmetry. 3 
None of the above-mentioned theories are able to explain this result. It is particularly 
problematic for the borrowing constraints hypothesis, according to which we should expect 
fiscal policy to be procyclical in bad times when the credit constraints are most likely to 
become binding. 
This paper offers a new explanation of the procyclical nature of fiscal policy. We set up a 
model in which fiscal policy is set by an incumbent politician who faces a trade-off between 
pleasing voters and abusing her powers for personal gain. The model builds on the tradition 
of retrospective voting models, which have their roots in Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986) and 
Persson and Tabellini (2000 ch. 4). In particular, our model is closely related to the political 
agency model of Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008). In their model procyclicality 
comes from voters’ attempt to “starve the Leviathan”. When income increases voters demand 
more government consumption or tax cuts, fearing that the extra revenue that the economic 
upturn generates would otherwise be wasted on political rents. The key assumption behind 
this result is a complete lack of fiscal transparency: politicians are assumed to be able to hide 
the true size of the government deficit to voters, who are therefore also unable to observe the 
level of political rents. 
                                                 
3 See for example Gavin and Perotti (1997), Persson and Tabellini (2003), Hercowitz and Strawczynski 
(2004) or Manasse (2006). 
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It is this restrictive assumption that we relax in our model. Specifically, we allow a positive 
degree of fiscal transparency, such that voters may detect an excessive deficit with some 
positive probability. This generates two new predictions. First, fiscal policy becomes 
asymmetric: departing from a low initial level, an increase in output will not lead to increased 
consumption demands. The reason is that the positive degree of transparency reduces the 
incentive for politicians to cheat voters, since there is now a positive risk of being exposed. 
Voters therefore rationally trust the incumbent to deliver a responsible fiscal policy, where 
increases in income are transmitted on to increases in the government surplus. As a 
consequence, fiscal policy becomes acyclical. When initial output is high, on the other hand, 
the reaction of fiscal policy to a further increase in output is different: the higher the level of 
income, the greater is the potential gain that the incumbent can obtain by cheating voters. In 
strong booms the incumbent can therefore not be trusted to deliver a responsible fiscal policy. 
The voters know this and the procyclical pattern of fiscal policy driven by voters’ attempt to 
“starve the Leviathan” emerges. Thus, the model can explain the stylized fact from the 
empirical literature that fiscal policy is more procyclical in good times than in bad times. This 
is in contrast to Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) where fiscal policy is always 
procyclical. The second main prediction from the model is that the higher the degree of fiscal 
transparency, the stronger the boom must be before fiscal policy becomes procyclical. Thus, 
we expect fiscal policy to be less procyclical in high-transparent countries. Alesina, 
Campante and Tabellini (2008) note that the procyclicality of fiscal policy is driven by 
politicians’ ability to collect rents so fiscal policy should be more procyclical in more corrupt 
countries. However, their model does not explain which institutional factors influence the 
scope for corruption and, hence, the procyclicality of fiscal policy. The model in this paper 
suggests one such candidate, namely the degree of fiscal transparency. It is exactly through a 
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reduced incentive to collect rents that fiscal transparency diminishes the procyclicality of 
fiscal policy. 
Fiscal transparency is the extent to which the general public can access truthful information 
about government budget matters. This issue has received increasing attention in recent years. 
Both the OECD and the IMF have implemented Codes of Best Practice for Fiscal 
Transparency, and The IMF and the World Bank publish Reports on Observation of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) for the Code of Best Practice for Fiscal Transparency on a 
regular basis for a broad range of countries. We are not the first to introduce fiscal 
transparency into a model of fiscal policy. Milesi-Ferretti (2004) analyses the interaction of 
fiscal transparency and fiscal rules in the determination of fiscal policy. Shi and Svensson 
(2006) and Alt and Lassen (2006a, 2006b) have highlighted the role of fiscal transparency in 
the occurrence of political budget cycles. Fiscal transparency, so the argument goes, reduces 
the scope for manipulating the budget around election time, since the risk that such 
manipulations are detected is higher. The link described above between fiscal transparency 
and the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy is something that we have not come across in the 
existing literature, however.  
We then turn to the empirical evidence and test our model’s predictions on two panel data 
sets: a sample of OECD countries and a sample of a broader range of countries. The evidence 
strongly confirms the asymmetry of fiscal policy in OECD countries, where government 
spending is much more procyclical in good times than in bad times. This does not appear to 
be the case in non-OECD countries. Our results indicate that fiscal transparency reduces the 
procyclical bias in good times in OECD countries, although the data also suggest an adverse 
effect in bad times. For the broad sample of countries, we find encouraging results in favour 
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of our hypothesis that fiscal policy is less procyclical in good times in countries where voters 
are better informed. 
2     The Model 
2.1 The Economic Environment 
We consider a model with two time periods. The economy is populated by an incumbent 
politician in charge of fiscal policy and a number of identical voters. The utility function of 
the representative voter is given by 
1 1 2 2( , ) ( , )U u c g u c gβ= + ⋅  (1) 
where tc  and tg  are the per capita levels of private and government consumption in period t, 
respectively, and the parameter β  is a discount factor. We assume that the period-utility is 
separable in private consumption and government consumption and that the utility of each 
type of consumption is given by a CRRA function: 
1 1
( , ) , 0 1
1 1
t t
t t
c gu c g
θ θ
θθ θ
− −
= + < <− −  (2) 
As in Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008), we assume that (1 )t t tc yτ= − , where yt is  
income per capita in period t and tτ  is the period t tax rate. Thus, we abstract from 
consumption smoothing via private credit markets. For simplicity, we ignore uncertainty 
about future income and assume that 2y is known in period 1. 
The government can issue debt in period 1 with full repayment, including interest, in 
period 2. Government revenue from tax- and debt financing may be spent in two different 
ways. First, the government can provide public consumption from which voters derive utility. 
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Second, resources may be spent on political rents. The most straightforward interpretation of 
political rents is that it is simply cash; the politician secures resources for herself by 
pocketing money taken from the government budget. However, the size of political rents 
could also be interpreted in a broad sense, namely as the extent to which the incumbent 
spends her time on campaigning, networking or leisure or engages in nepotism. The 
incumbent may also be tempted to spend resources on prestigious projects that serve no other 
purpose than boosting her own ego. Alternatively, political rents could be interpreted as the 
amount of contributions from lobbies and interest groups, which enrich the incumbent but 
lead to inferior policies that are hurtful to the voters. In short, political rents can be any kind 
of activity that is beneficial to the incumbent but directs resources away from the voters, to 
whom it is therefore wasteful. In this broad sense, a low level of rents should be interpreted 
as “good government”. 
With these assumptions the government budget constraints for the two periods (assuming 
no initial debt) become: 
1 1 1 1
2 2 1 2(1 )
t
t
y g d r
y g d r
τ
τ ρ
⋅ = − +
⋅ = + + +  (3) 
where d1 is the budget deficit in period 1, ρ is the (constant and exogenous) interest rate and rt 
denotes political rents in period t.  
Like Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) we assume that there is an upper limit to the 
size of the deficit, 0d > , that cannot be exceeded. This assumption should be seen as a 
simplification of the general idea that even governments are restrained by some checks and 
balances that prevent them from driving deficits to extreme levels. It should be emphasised 
that these checks and balances are not necessarily imposed by financial markets. They could 
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also be thought of as some kind of democratic control that restrains the politicians holding 
office.4 
We assume the following relationship between output in period 1 and period 2: 
1
2 (1 )
y y
y y
ε
ρ ε
= +
= − +  (4) 
where y  is a natural output level (or trend level) and ε is a short term fluctuation. This 
specification might seem odd at a first glance; after all, a positive output shock today does not 
necessarily imply a negative shock next year. However, the specification above allows us to 
focus on fluctuations in output, holding constant the present discounted value of life-time 
income. Seen from the point of view of the government, an increase in ε shifts revenue from 
period 2 to period 1, leaving the total discounted value of revenue unchanged. But this is 
exactly the kind of fluctuation we are interested in, since it allows a comparison between a 
flat time profile of income (ε = 0) against a fluctuating time profile (ε ≠ 0). Thus, the 
specification in (4) should merely be seen as an easy way of focusing on what we are really 
interested in, namely how fiscal policy depends on the distribution across time periods of a 
given present discounted value of income.5  
Obviously, the optimal policy as seen from the voters’ point of view includes zero political 
rents, 1 2 0r r= = . Maximising voter utility with respect to g1, g2, c1 and c2, subject to (3), (4) 
and (1 )t t tc yτ= −  yields the solution 
1 2 1 2
1
2
c c g g y= = = =  (5) 
                                                 
4 We could also interpret the upper limit on the deficit as a consequence of self-imposed fiscal rules such as 
the Stability and Growth Pact in the EMU or the balanced budget rules that exist in most US states.  
5 All results of the model still hold qualitatively if we assume no relation between y1 and y2. But then we get 
an additional effect of an increase in y1 on fiscal policy, namely a wealth effect of higher total discounted 
revenue. Since this is not what we are interested in, we prefer the specification in (4). 
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where we have assumed 1(1 )ρ β−+ = .6 The important point to note here is that the shock 
variable ε is nowhere present in the solution. The optimal consumption profile depends only 
on the present discounted value of income, not on the distribution across time periods. In this 
sense, the optimal fiscal policy is acyclical: because of voters’ desire for consumption 
smoothing, private- and government consumption should not vary over the business cycle. 
Tax rates are then given by ( ) 11 2t ty yτ −= − ⋅ . Thus, in response to a shift in output from 
period 2 to period 1, a social planner would raise taxes in period 1 and lower taxes in period 2 
to keep private consumption unchanged. Finally, the optimal policy implies 1d ε= − , so that 
all fluctuations in output are fully absorbed by the deficit. 
2.2 The Political Environment 
In the first period the incumbent chooses fiscal policy and the voters decide whether or not 
to re-elect her for period 2. After period 2, the incumbent has no possibility of re-election. 
Voters are backward-looking and condition their voting strategy on already observed 
outcomes only. Further, since all politicians are assumed to be identical (no adverse 
selection), elections serve the sole purpose of allowing voters to reward or punish the 
incumbent. Specifically, voters can choose to punish an ill-performing incumbent by electing 
an identical opponent. 
As in Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) and in most of the modern literature on 
electoral cycles7 we assume that voters observe the levels of output, taxes, private 
consumption and government consumption before the election. Political rents cannot be 
observed. Further, the size of the deficit is not necessarily observable to the voters. This 
                                                 
6 Assuming 1(1 )ρ β−+ ≠  does not change the results qualitatively, but complicates the algebra.  
7 See for example Alt and Lassen (2006a) or Shi and Svensson (2006). 
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captures the idea that the government can hide information about its borrowing needs from 
the public through various creative accounting techniques. For instance, the government may 
manipulate the official size of the deficit by strategically picking out which items should be 
kept in and out of the budget. In other words, there is a lack of transparency in the budget 
process. However, this lack of transparency is not complete: we assume that a deviation 
between the true deficit and the officially reported deficit is detected with a positive 
probability p, which is known to everyone. This is an important difference compared to 
Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) who implicitly assume p = 0. Following Alt and 
Lassen (2006b), we interpret p as a measure of the degree of fiscal transparency.  
The objective function of the incumbent is: 
2
1 1
rV r δ ρ= + ⋅ +  (6) 
where δ  is the probability that the incumbent is re-elected. Thus, the incumbent maximises 
the expected, discounted value of political rents. 
The voters realise that the incumbent has an incentive to increase the deficit, raise taxes or 
lower government consumption in period 1 to increase political rents. They therefore 
condition re-election on observed performance by choosing reservation levels for government 
consumption, the tax rate and the deficit, g∗ , τ ∗  and d ∗ , respectively. The probability that 
the voters will re-elect the incumbent is then given by: 
1 1 11 ,
0
if g g and no detectionof d d
otherwise
τ τδ
∗ ∗ ∗⎧ ≥ ≤ >= ⎨⎩
 (7) 
Note that not detecting 1d d
∗>  can either mean that the incumbent did actually obey voter 
demands (so that 1d d
∗≤ ), or that an excessive deficit ( 1d d ∗> ) went undiscovered, which 
   
11 
 
happens with probability 1-p. The key point is that voters cannot distinguish these situations 
from each other. 
 The strategy above differs from a traditional voting strategy in the literature of 
retrospective voting models, in which voters usually formulate their re-election rule in terms 
of a reservation utility level. Here, voters instead condition re-election directly on fiscal 
policy variables.8 In comparison with Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) the inclusion 
of a reservation level for the government deficit is also new. The reason is that in their model 
there is no chance of detecting an excessive deficit, since p = 0; setting a reservation level for 
the deficit is therefore pointless. Thus, allowing a positive value of p opens up for a more 
sophisticated voter strategy. 
The incumbent observes voter demands and sets fiscal policy to maximise (6) subject to 
(7), the government budget constraint and the restriction td d≤ . The incumbent has three 
options: she can (i) satisfy the voters’ demands for government consumption and the tax rate 
as well as the size of the deficit and secure herself re-election, (ii) satisfy the demand for 
government consumption and the tax rate only, run an excessive deficit and hope that this 
will go undetected, or (iii) satisfy none of the demands and forego re-election with certainty. 
In the latter case we assume that there is a maximum level of rents, 0r > , that the incumbent 
can extract without being caught and immediately exempt from office.9 We further assume 
that r  is sufficiently small relative to y , such that (1 )ty d rρ− + ≥ , 1, 2t =  for all possible 
                                                 
8 Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 4) consistently formulate the voters´ strategy in terms of utility. However, 
in a footnote they note that voters could actually do better if they formulate their strategy in terms of policy 
variables. The same is true in our model. By conditioning re-election on the size of the deficit, voters are 
implicitly choosing a reservation level for utility in period 2 also, since the deficit has direct consequences for 
the level of consumption in period 2. 
9 Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) assume that the maximum amount of rents depends positively on 
the current level of output, such that the restriction is t tr r yγ≤ + . Setting 0γ =  only has minor implications 
for our results, so we stick with this simpler version here. We solve the model with 0γ >  in the appendix. 
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realizations of ε. This assumption ensures that the incumbent always has the option of 
extracting maximum rents without driving private- or public consumption below zero. 
The timing of the model is now as follows: (I) At the start of period 1 voters observe trend 
output y  and the output shock ε. They then select the reservation values g*, τ* and d* and the 
strategy in (7) is known by everyone hereafter. (II) The incumbent observes g*, τ*  and d* and 
chooses fiscal policy for period 1. (III) Voters observe the size of g1 and 1τ . If the incumbent 
has set 1d d
∗>  this becomes known to everyone with probability p. (IV) Elections are held 
and the voters now vote according to their declared strategy in (7). In period 2 the elected 
politician chooses fiscal policy and the model ends. 
2.3 Equilibrium Strategies 
We start by looking at the optimal strategy for the incumbent, given the voters’ reservation 
levels g*, τ* and d*, using backwards induction. After the election the victorious politician has 
no re-election motive, so she will ignore any voter demands set political rents at the 
maximum value, 2r r= . We assume that once the incumbent has secured maximum rents, 
she ensures an optimal balance between public and private consumption with the remaining 
resources in period 2. This implies equality between the marginal utilities of public and 
private consumption, which in our case means 2 2g c= . Coupled with the government budget 
constraint, this implies that ( )2 2 1(1 )( ) / 2g c y d rρ ε= = − + + − . 
We now look at each of the incumbent’s three options in period 1: in option (i) the 
incumbent satisfies all voter demands and sets 1g g
∗= , 1τ τ ∗=  and 1d d ∗= . Using the 
government budget constraint in (3), this gives us that political rents are 
* *
1 ( )tr y g dτ ε= + − + . In option (i) the incumbent is re-elected with certainty, which has a 
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present value of /(1 )r ρ+ . Thus, defining 1V  as the expected discounted value of political 
rents in option (i), we get: 
* * *
1 ( ) 1
rV y g dτ ε ρ= + − + + +  (8) 
In option (ii) the incumbent does not satisfy the voters’ demand for the size of the deficit. 
The incumbent will in this case set the deficit at its maximum value, d , since this allows 
more rents to be extracted. Re-election now only occurs if the excessive deficit is 
undiscovered, which happens with probability 1 p− . Defining 2V  as the expected discounted 
value of political rents in option (ii) we have 
* *
2 ( ) (1 )1
rV y g d pτ ε ρ= + − + + − +  (9) 
Finally, the incumbent always has the option of completely disregarding the voters’ 
demands. In this case she will set rents and the deficit at their maximum values in period 1 
and forego re-election. Defining 3V  in the same way as 1V  and 2V : 
3V r=  (10) 
Voters must now choose optimal values of g* and d* such that the incumbent chooses 
option (i).10 We can then state the problem of the voters as: 
( ) ( )( )
* * *
11 ** *1
, ,
1 2 1 3
(1 )( ) / 2(1 )( )
2
1 1 1
. .
g d
y d ry gMax
s t V V and V V
θθ θ
τ
ρ ετ ε βθ θ θ
−− − − + + −− + + + ⋅− − −
≥ ≥
 
(11) 
where we have inserted the expressions for c2 and g2 found above. Using equations (8)-(10) 
and 1(1 )ρ β−+ =  we can write the two constraints in this problem as  
                                                 
10 It is never optimal for the voters to choose reservation values such that the incumbent chooses option (ii) or 
option (iii). A proof of this claim can be obtained upon request. 
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* * * * * *
1 2
* * * * * *
1 3
1 1: ( ) ( )
1 1
1: ( ) ( ) (1 )
1
V V y g d r y g d p r p r d d
V V y g d r r y g d r
τ ε τ ε βρ ρ
τ ε τ ε βρ
≥ + − + + ≥ + − + − ⇔ ≥ −+ +
≥ + − + + ≥ ⇔ + − + ≥ −+
 
(12) 
It is fairly easy to see that the constraint 1 3V V≥  must be binding in equilibrium. If this 
constraint were satisfied with strict inequality the voters could raise *g  or lower *τ  without 
violating either of the constraints and we must therefore have 1 3V V=  in equilibrium. In 
contrast, it is of great importance to the equilibrium outcome whether the constraint 1 2V V≥  
becomes binding or not. 
In the appendix we show that the values of the deficit, consumption and tax rates that solve 
the problem in (11) are given by 
( )
( )( )
( )( )
1
1 2 1 2
2 1
1
11
1
11 1
2
(1 ) / 2
(1 )
1 (1 ) 2( ) 1
1 (1 ) 2( )
c c g g y r
d r
if p r d
y r y
y r y
β
ε β β βε βτ β ε β
τ β β ε
−
−
−−
−− −
= = = = − +
= − − + ⎛ ⎞< − −⎜ ⎟= − − + + +⎝ ⎠
= − − + −
 (I) 
and 
( )
( )
( )( )
( )( )
1 1
1
2 2
1
1
1
11 1
2
(1 (1 ) ) / 2
( ) (1 ) / 2
1
1 (1 (1 ) ) 2( )
1 ( ) (1 ) 2( )
c g y d p r
c g y d p r
d d p r if p r d
y d p r y
y d p r y
ε β
β ε
ββ ε ββτ ε β ε
τ β ε β ε
−
−
−− −
= = + + − − −
= = − + − −
⎛ ⎞= − ≥ − −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠= − + + − − − +
= − − + − − −
 
(II) 
Using the government budget constraint, we then find that political rents are in both of the 
above solutions given by 1 (1 )r rβ= − . If the shock to output in period 1 is sufficiently small, 
such that relative to period 2 the economy is in a recession or a modest boom, the solution in 
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(I) applies. This solution is similar to the solution of the social planner: fluctuations in output 
are transmitted directly into the budget surplus, with no effect on the time profile of 
government consumption. Tax rates increase with output in order to smooth private 
consumption. Thus, fiscal policy is acyclical. Compared to the solution of the social planner, 
the only difference is the lower level of government consumption, which is due to a positive 
level of political rents. This is necessary to keep the incumbent from choosing option (iii) 
above.  
The solution in (II), which applies in case of a high value of ε, is very much different from 
the social planner’s solution, however. Fluctuations in output are not smoothed at all. An 
increase in ε  now has no effect on the deficit. The tax rate in period 1 may go up or down as 
output increases, depending on the initial level, but private consumption increases 
unambiguously. Government consumption also rises in period 1 as ε increases. The lower 
level of revenue in period 2 then implies that private- and government consumption in period 
2 falls. The timing of output now matters for the time profile of consumption and fiscal 
policy becomes procyclical. 
So when does which solution apply? Technically, the difference between solution (I)  and 
solution (II) is that the constraint 1 2V V≥  is binding in solution (II), whereas it is satisfied with 
strict inequality in solution (I). On a more intuitive level, the decisive condition on ε reveals 
an interesting prediction: fiscal policy becomes procyclical only when the economy is in a 
boom. Consider a shift in output from period 2 to period 1, i.e. an increase in the shock 
variable ε.  Ideally, this should have no effect on the time profile of consumption, since such 
a shift does not affect the intertemporal government budget constraint. To smooth 
consumption, voters would therefore prefer a smaller deficit in period 1 when ε  increases. 
This is exactly what happens when the economy is in a recession: departing from a low value, 
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a small increase in ε makes voters require a smaller budget deficit and unchanged levels of 
private- and government consumption in exchange for their vote. To secure herself re-
election, the incumbent willingly satisfies the voters’ demands and fiscal policy becomes 
acyclical. 
If the economy is in a boom things are different: ideally, voters would now like to run a 
budget surplus in order to smooth consumption over the two time periods. But the high level 
of revenue during a boom provides the incumbent with an alternative that is too tempting to 
resist: since there is a chance an excessive deficit will go undetected, the incumbent will be 
tempted to drive the deficit to its maximum and pocket the bulk of the extraordinarily high 
revenue. In technical terms, the temptation to choose option (ii) instead of option (i) is too 
big. The constraint 1 2V V≥  now becomes binding. Realising this, voters will adjust their 
demands in such a situation. So when output increases further, voters now demand higher 
levels of consumption instead of a deficit reduction. The result is that fiscal policy now reacts 
strongly to output fluctuations in a procyclical manner. In sum, the model predicts that there 
is an asymmetry in the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy: during recessions fiscal policy is 
acyclical. During booms, however, the political agency problem becomes more severe and 
fiscal policy becomes procyclical. 
We now focus on the transparency variable p. The condition on ε for the solution in (I) to 
apply can be rewritten as 1( )p d d rβ≥ − , where 1 21 (1 )d rε β β−= − − +  is the solution for 
the deficit given in (I). First, as a benchmark, consider the case p = 0: since d1 is by definition 
smaller than d , the inequality above is never  satisfied for p = 0. Thus, we conclude that fiscal 
policy is always procyclical when fiscal transparency is completely absent, which is also the 
case in Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008). However, with a positive value of p the 
inequality may be satisfied. Let 1( (1 ) )p r dε β β β−≡ − + −?  be the maximum value of the 
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shock ε  that is consistent with solution (I). A higher value of p increases this critical value, 
such that for any distribution of ε, a higher p increases the probability that solution (I) 
applies. A higher degree of transparency makes procyclical fiscal policy occur less 
frequently, as illustrated in Figure 1 below. To understand this result, remember that fiscal 
policy becomes procyclical in good times because voters rationally adjust their consumption 
demands upwards, fearing that the incumbent would otherwise waste the high level of 
revenue on political rents and run an excessive deficit. But a higher degree of transparency 
makes it less attractive to run an excessive deficit for the incumbent, since it increases the 
risk of being exposed. Thus, the higher the degree of transparency, the stronger must the 
boom be before the incumbent falls into temptation and runs a maximum deficit. This implies 
that voters will be willing to trust the incumbent with a larger amount of resources before 
they alter their consumption demands. In countries with a high degree of fiscal transparency 
we should therefore expect to see a procyclical reaction of fiscal policy in strong booms only. 
In countries with a low degree of transparency, on the other hand, procyclical fiscal policy 
could occur at a much higher frequency. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
2.4 Discussion 
The reason that fiscal policy is only procyclical in good times according to our model is 
that the temptation to cheat voters is stronger in booms. This is due to the fact that the amount 
of available resources is higher in booms than in recessions. For this to be a convincing story 
for developed countries we must emphasise the broad interpretation of political rents: when 
the level of income rises the incumbent can deliver the same levels of consumption with less 
effort, requiring a less careful conduct of fiscal policy, and with more room for superfluous 
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spending on “ego-boosting” projects etc.  Moreover, the model captures a general 
mechanism, which we believe is important in developed countries, namely that the pressure 
on the government from outside watchdogs such as the media, the opposition, international 
organisations and various interest groups is plausibly much stronger in recessions than in 
booms. Thus, the major benefit to the incumbent of a strong economy is the quiet life: with 
attention removed from budgetary issues it becomes easier to engage in all the activities that 
we have previously labelled as “extracting rents”. The result, just as in our model, is that the 
temptation to increase rent extraction at the expense of a deficit reduction is higher in booms 
than in recessions. This is exactly what drives the asymmetric cyclical response of fiscal 
policy, since rational voters will then only demand a procyclical pattern in good times, when 
the temptation to cheat would otherwise dominate the fear of not earning re-election. 
2.5 Discretionary versus automatic responses 
In the empirical analyses in the following sections we distinguish discretionary fiscal 
policy responses from the effects of “automatic stabilisers”. We must therefore be precise 
about what our model predicts for each of these two types of responses to output fluctuations.  
In our model, economic fluctuations has an “automatic” impact on the government budget 
through the revenue side only, so all changes in government spending are by definition 
discretionary. On the other hand, changes in government revenue consist of an automatic 
effect, which occurs even in the absence of changes to the policy variables, and a 
discretionary response, which is entirely due to changes in the tax rate. We can break down 
the total period 1 revenue response to an increase in ε  as follows: 
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The first term in each line corresponds to the discretionary response, while the second term 
corresponds to the automatic effect. According to our model, total revenue always increases 
when output rises, but less so in good times. The discretionary revenue response is positive in 
bad times because the tax rate goes up when output goes up. In contrast, it may be positive or 
negative in good times, reflecting the ambiguous effect on the tax rate in this case. Table 1 
summarizes the model’s predictions for discretionary as well as total responses of three key 
fiscal variables.   
[Table 1 about here] 
The category “surplus” corresponds to the primary surplus, which is defined as the 
difference between total revenue and total government expenses (consumption plus rents), 
excluding interest payments. The discretionary response of the primary surplus is 
equivalently defined as the difference between the discretionary revenue response and the 
discretionary expenditure response. It is worth noting that although the tax rate may in good 
times go up in response to an increase in output, the effect from the expenditure side 
dominates, so that the discretionary response of the surplus is unambiguously negative in 
good times.  
We expect a higher degree of fiscal transparency to pull all fiscal variables in a 
countercyclical direction in good times. For spending variables this means that the positive 
sign in good times should become weaker as the degree of transparency increases. The model 
predicts that there is no effect of fiscal transparency on the cyclicality of fiscal policy in bad 
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times. In practice, the validity of this prediction depends on how we define good times and 
bad times. But the essential message from the model is that the effect of fiscal transparency 
should be stronger in good times than in bad times, for any reasonable definition of these 
terms. 
3     Empirical Methodology 
We next turn to the data to test the implications of the model presented in the previous 
section. We do this on two different panel data sets: the first data set consists of annual 
observations for 21 OECD countries in the period 1989-2003.11 The second data set broadens 
the sample of countries and the time period considered, covering 59 countries in the years 
1980-1998. The sample of countries corresponds to Persson and Tabellini’s (2003) data set.   
To uncover the causal effect from business cycle fluctuations to fiscal policy we regress a 
fiscal indicator variable on a cyclical indicator interacted with variables of interest and a 
range of control variables. Moreover, we include a lag of the dependent variable to take into 
account any lags in the political decision process. We also include time- and country fixed 
effects. Thus, the baseline specification of the fiscal policy equation that we estimate is  
, 0 1 , 1 , , 1, 2,..., , 2,....i t i t i t i tF F v i N t Tα α η λ− ′ ′= + ⋅ + + + + + = =i,t i,tβ Y γ X         (13)  
where Fi,t is our indicator of fiscal policy. Yi,t denotes a vector containing one or more 
interaction terms between the cyclical indicator and some variable of interest. The vector Xi,t 
denotes a set of control variables. We estimate equation (13) using OLS and Within. 
However, it is well known that both these estimators are biased in the presence of a fixed 
                                                 
11 The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and USA. 
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effect and a lagged dependent variable. To account for this we also use the GMM system 
estimator developed in Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998). In addition, to account for the possible reverse causality running from fiscal 
policy to macroeconomic conditions we always instrument the cyclical indicator with its own 
lags. 
4      The Data 
Indicator of Fiscal Policy: As our measures of fiscal policy we focus on government 
expenditure.12 To isolate the discretionary part of fiscal policy we use cyclically adjusted 
current disbursement excluding interest (from the OECD EO data base)13 as our fiscal 
indicator for the OECD sample. To allow for comparisons across countries we express our 
fiscal variables relative to trend GDP. We use trend GDP instead of actual GDP to avoid 
ambiguities with the interpretation of the β  coefficients, which occurs when dividing the 
fiscal indicator with a variable that fluctuates over the business cycle.14 For the broader 
sample of countries only unadjusted fiscal data is available and so we use government 
spending relative to GDP from the Persson and Tabellini data set. When using unadjusted 
data, a note of caution is in order: the working of automatic stabilizers will pull our estimates 
in a countercyclical direction. We therefore concentrate on the relative size of the coefficients 
                                                 
12 Corresponding results for government surplus and revenue are not reported but are available upon request.   
13 All fiscal variables used in the OECD sample are general government budget variables from the OECD 
Economic Outlook (EO) database 
14 Remember, that we defined a procyclical fiscal policy as a policy where an increase in economic activity 
leads to discretionary policy changes in the form of a higher level of government spending and/or tax cuts. If 
expenditure increases with economic activity the expenditure to GDP ratio may increase, decrease or stay 
unchanged when income rises. Thus, any sign of β could be consistent with a procyclical policy when 
expenditure is expressed relative to actual GDP. Dividing with trend GDP solves this problem, since trend GDP 
does not vary over the business cycle. For trend GDP we use OECD’s calculation of potential GDP (using the 
production function method) available in the OECD EO database. For the Persson and Tabellini sample 
potential GDP is not available and so we divide with actual GDP, keeping in mind the caveats that arise from 
doing so. 
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within the β  vector, and not so much on the actual signs of the individual β  coefficients in 
this case. 
Cyclical Indicator: For the OECD sample we use the output gap (OECD EO database) as 
our cyclical indicator. For the broader sample of countries we use the output gap from the 
Persson and Tabellini data set (based on HP filtering). Our model predicts that the response 
of fiscal policy to economic fluctuations during good times differs from the response in bad 
times. We therefore interact the output gap with dummy variables for good times (positive 
output gap) and bad times (negative output gap). We also include the dummy for positive 
output gap ( posd ) in the regression to control for any level differences in government 
spending.15  
Fiscal transparency: In addition we also include a measure of fiscal transparency 
interacted with the output gap (in both good and bad times). For our OECD sample we use 
the fiscal transparency index developed in Alt and Lassen (2006b). This index ranges from 0 
to 11 where each point represents an affirmative answer to a question concerning fiscal 
transparency sent to all budget directors of OECD member countries. The questions are 
presented in table 3.16 For the broader sample of countries no explicit index for fiscal 
transparency is available. However, our theoretical prior is that a higher degree of fiscal 
transparency reduces the procyclicality of fiscal policy through an improvement of the voters’ 
ability to monitor the actions of the incumbent. Such an improvement of the monitoring 
technology may come about through other channels than direct reforms of the budget 
procedure. First of all, we expect the media to play a key role in this respect. Greater popular 
                                                 
15 A similar approach is used in Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) and Persson and Tabellini (2003). 
However, these authors do not include the level dummy for positive output gap. 
16 Compared to Alt and Lassens’s index we drop the question shown in column (6) in Table 3 due to missing 
observations for Greece, Portugal and Spain. Further, we also include the question in column (11). Note that the 
index is constant over time. 
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access to independent media is likely to enhance the general public’s insight into fiscal 
affairs. Shi and Svensson (2006) develop an indicator to proxy for the share of informed 
voters in the population. The indicator is the product of the number of radios per capita and a 
dummy variable equal to one if the country is classified as having freedom of broadcasting 
(based on information from Freedom House). We use this indicator, which is available for 54 
countries in our sample in the years 1980-1995. 
Exogenous control variables: The vector i,tX  contains the control variables used in our 
benchmark specification, of which many have become standard in cross-sectional and panel 
data studies of fiscal policy. We use the following benchmark control variables: the 
demographic dependency ratio, the sum of exports and imports as a ratio to GDP, the 
inflation rate, a dummy for election year, a measure of trend or structural unemployment, the 
government debt to GDP ratio in the previous year, a dummy for majoritarian electoral 
system and the natural log of trend real GDP per capita. In the broad sample we also include 
a dummy for democracy and a dummy for presidential form of government. By default we 
include time dummies to control for sample-wide exogenous shocks. However, we sometime 
remove these dummies to restore degrees of freedom. For the OECD sample the data for 
inflation, NAIRU and government debt are from the OECD EO database, the dummies for 
election year and majoritarian systems are taken from the Persson and Tabellini data set and 
the IEFS election guide17. The data for trend income, openness to trade and the dependency 
ratio are from WDI (2005). For the broader sample we use the Persson and Tabellini data set 
as the source except for inflation and trend income, which is taken from WDI (2005). Due to 
lack of data availability trend unemployment and debt are omitted from the regressions based 
on this sample. 
                                                 
17 Data for elections after 1998 are taken from the IEFS Election guide. 
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5     Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries 
5.1 Fiscal Policy and Asymmetric Responses to Economic Activity 
Columns (1) to (6) in Table 2 show estimation results for cyclically adjusted government 
spending for the OECD countries. Columns (1)-(3) report the results using a specification 
where the output gap is included without any interaction terms. The coefficient on gap is 
statistically insignificant in all three columns, indicating that government spending is 
acyclical. This is in line with what previous studies have found for the OECD countries (e.g. 
Talvi and Végh (2005) and Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008))18. However, this result 
comes about from mixing up two regimes. Columns (4)-(6) split the output gap into good and 
bad times and include a dummy for positive output gap. The result from doing so is striking. 
The coefficient on the output gap interacted with a dummy for good times ( posgap d⋅ ) is 
clearly positive and highly significant for all estimators considered. The corresponding 
coefficient for bad times is insignificant and very close to zero. Thus, government spending 
seems to be procyclical in good times and acyclical in bad times, which is in line with our 
model’s predictions.19 Our estimates suggest that, during good times, the increase in 
government spending in reaction to a one percentage point increase in the output gap could 
be as large as one percent of potential GDP. The lowest estimate (GMMSYS) suggests an 
increase of about  
[Table 2 about here] 
                                                 
18 Previous studies obtaining this result often use cyclically unadjusted variables as well as using dependent 
variables relative to GDP, rather than trend or potential GDP. 
19 Looking at government revenue we do not find the same clear asymmetric response, in fact, revenue seems 
acyclical or counter cyclical in good times. The results for the government surplus are similar to the spending 
results, only weaker, and we therefore conclude that this procyclical result comes from the spending side of the 
government budget. 
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0.25 percent of potential GDP. The level dummy posd is negative, indicating that spending 
drops a little in level when the output gap becomes positive, however, the coefficient is not 
significant. 20 
In Column (7) we consider the unadjusted current disbursements as the dependent variable. 
This serves as a robustness check since as explained above, we expect the results to be pulled 
in a countercyclical direction due to the presence of automatic stabilisers. The result is the 
same clear profile as with the adjusted data: government spending is significantly more 
procyclical in good times than in bad times. In columns (8) to (10) we look at subcomponents 
of (unadjusted) government spending. Government consumption is procyclical in good times, 
and more so than in bad times, although the difference is less pronounced than for overall 
spending. Even Social Security Benefits, which we would expect to be heavily influenced by 
automatic stabilisers, display a procyclical behaviour in good times (and countercyclical 
behaviour in bad times).  
5.2 Fiscal Transparency 
The next step of our analysis is to include a measure of fiscal transparency in our 
econometric specification. We start by interacting the output gap in good and bad times with 
each of the dummies used to construct the transparency index in Alt and Lassen (2006b), 
using one dummy at a time.21 The results are summarised in  
                                                 
20 To test whether our results are affected by the introduction of the EMU, we experimented with including 
an interaction term between a dummy for EMU participation (equal to 1 after 1994) and the output gap in good 
and bad times. The results suggested that the procyclical response in good times is halved from EMU 
membership, but the coefficient on posgap d⋅  was in all cases still positive and significant. The effect of EMU 
participation in bad times was insignificant for OLS and Within, however, GMMSYS suggested that spending 
policies are more countercyclical in bad times in EMU countries.  
21 We present the results for 12 questions on transparency (the dummies are equal to 1 in case of 
transparency). The index used in Alt and Lassen (2006b) includes 11 of these questions, since the question in 
column 11 in  
Table 3 is not included in their original index. 
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Table 3 below: using the GMMSYS estimator we find that most of the fiscal transparency 
dummies reduce the procyclicality of cyclically adjusted spending in good times. Some 
questions have a very clear significant effect: a legal requirement of an ex post comparison 
between projected and actual expenditures (question [5]) reduces the procyclicality of 
spending in good times, and this effect is significant at the 1% level. The same strong effect 
appears if the government is required to produce actuarial estimates for social security 
spending (question [11]). The first of these results fits particularly nicely with our theoretical 
priors: large discrepancies between projected and actual spending seem like a strong warning 
sign that the government may be trying to hide a large deficit. Thus, a legal requirement of an 
ex post comparison makes it quite likely that “cheating” governments will be exposed. We 
therefore believe that this question picks up the idea behind our model parameter of fiscal 
transparency, p, quite accurately and the accordance with our theoretical priors is 
encouraging.  
Next we move on to consider the aggregation of the dummies in Table 3 into a full index 
(transp11).22 Columns (1)-(3) in Table 4 show the results for cyclically adjusted government 
spending. The coefficient on transp11 interacted with the output gap in good times is negative 
and significant at a 10% level. This is in nice accordance with our theory: a back-of-the- 
envelope calculation suggests that in a country scoring zero in the transparency index, 
government spending increases by 0.32 percent of potential GDP in reaction to an increase of 
1 percentage point in the output gap during good times. The corresponding reaction in a 
country at the other end of the transparency scale is an increase of 0.32 -11·0.029 = 0.00. 
Thus, going from a complete lack of transparency to full disclosure eliminates the procyclical 
reaction of government spending in good times. 
                                                 
22 We drop question 6 in all cases due to missing observations. 
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One result that apparently goes against our model’s predictions is the result for the question 
in column 9 in Table 3, which suggests that fiscal policy becomes more procyclical in good 
times if the budget discusses the impact of variations in key economic assumptions on the 
budget outcome. However, we are not convinced that this unambiguously reflects a higher 
degree of fiscal transparency: discussions of key economic assumptions may be used to divert 
attention from the most likely outcome by side ordering several different scenarios. Stating 
such multiple budget scenarios without a proper weighting of relevance can be seen as a 
move away from the principle of ‘one bottom line’ (Poterba and von Hagen [1999]). In this 
way, a “discussion of key economic assumptions” can be a convenient euphemism for 
submitting multiple scenarios, with the purpose of clouding, rather than clarifying, the actual 
budgetary prospects. In light of this ambiguity, we tried removing this question from the 
[Table 3 and Table 4 about here] 
transparency index. The resulting index is labeled transp10 in Table 4. We obtain a negative 
and significant (at a 5% level) coefficient on the term interacting this transparency index with 
the output gap in good times. Thus we confirm the above spending profile and effect of 
transparency, but with question 9 omitted from the index the statistical significance is much 
stronger. 
So far we have avoided the results for transparency in bad times. The story is not quite as 
we expected: in most estimations we find that the coefficient on the interaction between the 
output gap in bad times and the transparency indices are positive and significant (on a 1% 
level). This suggests that fiscal policy in bad times becomes more procyclical when 
transparency increases. This does not square with our theory. Taken at face value, our results 
indicate that the countries that have a high degree of fiscal transparency are also the countries 
that have been most prone to running procyclical policies during bad times. However, it is 
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likely that the high degree of fiscal transparency is caused by the exact same procyclical 
policies, rather than the other way around. In other words, we suspect that the 
counterintuitive sign arises due to a problem of reverse causality. Procyclical fiscal policies 
during recessions can be extremely damaging and may trigger reforms that increase the 
degree of fiscal transparency. If this is indeed the case, and we estimate an equation like (13) 
with a time invariant measure of fiscal transparency, we may falsely conclude that the 
causation runs in the opposite direction, that is, that a higher degree of fiscal transparency 
leads to a procyclical fiscal policy during periods of low economic activity. In the lack of 
obvious candidates for instrumental variables we do not attempt to correct this problem. 
Rather, we advice that the potential endogeneity of fiscal transparency should be kept in mind 
when interpreting our results. Note however, that the main driver behind this result seems to 
be question 3 in Table 3, whereas the effect seems much weaker for the other questions. Also 
note that this type of bias is also likely to affect our results for good times. This cannot 
explain the obtained results, however. On the contrary, the presence of such reverse causality 
in good times would work against our theoretical priors and pull the coefficient on 
j postransp gap d⋅ ⋅  in a positive direction. On this background, the obtained negative 
coefficients are even more noteworthy. 
As another robustness check we also consider the effect of transparency when using the 
unadjusted current disbursements as the dependent variable. From Table 4 we see now that 
we obtain a negative and significant coefficient (at a 1% level) on 11 postransp gap d⋅ ⋅ . The 
results are only further confirmed when using transp10. The same effect is present in the 
subcomponents of spending, although it seems to be somewhat weaker for social security 
benefits (insignificant but with the correct sign). The effect of fiscal transparency on the 
procyclicality of fiscal policy in good times seems to be stronger when using unadjusted data 
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than when using adjusted data. This suggests that the degree of fiscal transparency matters 
not only for the discretionary part of fiscal policy, but also for the strength and magnitude of 
automatic stabilisers.23 
6     Evidence from a Broader Sample of Countries 
We next move on to consider the evidence of asymmetric spending policies and the effect 
of voter information in a broad sample of countries. Having a sample of both developed and 
developing countries enables us examine whether fiscal policy is inherently less procyclical 
in developed countries than in developing countries, as claimed in some studies.24  
6.1 Asymmetries in Fiscal Policy 
In Table 5 we look at the cyclical response for government expenditure. The coefficients 
on the output gap in columns (1)-(3) are all positive, albeit only mildly statistically significant 
in column (2). Remember that the sign of the coefficient on the output gap generally does not 
have an unambiguous interpretation when the dependent variable is cyclically unadjusted and 
in percent of actual GDP. However, a positive coefficient when the dependent variable is 
government spending to GDP provides a single exception from this rule, since the positive 
relationship can neither be caused by automatic stabilisers, nor by the division by actual GDP 
(both should pull in the direction of a negative relationship). Thus, there is in fact evidence of 
a procyclical spending pattern among the countries considered in this section.  
                                                 
23 Large automatic stabilisers make the government budget more sensitive to fluctuations in economic 
activity. In good times this implies that a larger amount of resources are left at the discretion of the incumbent. 
Our theory suggests that voters will only accept this if fiscal policy is sufficiently transparent. Thus, it is 
possible that greater fiscal transparency makes voters more willing to accept large automatic stabilisers (more 
generous unemployment benefits and higher tax progression), yielding a more countercyclical fiscal policy. In 
this sense, fiscal transparency could also have a long term effect by altering the legislation that governs the 
automatic stabilisers, which again has an effect on the short term stabilisation of the economy. 
24 See e.g. Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Talvi and Végh (2005). 
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Splitting the output gap variable into positive and negative values as in columns (4)-(7) 
only provides very weak evidence of an asymmetry in the spending pattern – unlike in the 
OECD sample. The coefficient on the output gap in good times is in all columns except (7) 
higher than the coefficient on the output gap in bad times, but in all cases a t-test fails to 
reject the hypothesis that they are in fact equal. 
6.2 OECD Countries versus Non-OECD Countries 
Judging from the results in the previous section, it seems that the results that we obtained 
for the OECD countries do not apply to a more heterogeneous group of countries. We now 
explore this issue in further detail, explicitly distinguishing OECD countries from non-OECD 
countries. In Table 6 columns (1)-(3) we find indications of a procyclical pattern in OECD 
countries which does not seem to be present in non-OECD countries. This is in contrast to 
earlier results in the literature, e.g. the results in Talvi and Végh (2005). Note however, that 
the hypothesis of equal output gap coefficients in the spending equation for the two groups of 
countries is only rejected in column (1).25 In columns (4)-(8) we dig deeper into the spending 
policy differences between OECD and non-OECD countries. In addition to separating OECD 
countries from non-OECD countries we now also distinguish good times from bad times. 
Since the Within estimates in column (5) are very large and imprecisely determined, we 
report results from a Within estimation where the level dummies for positive output gaps 
have been removed in column (6). The GMMSYS estimates in column (7) have high standard 
errors and we therefore also report GMMSYS estimates omitting time dummies in column 
                                                 
25 Looking at the surplus we find that in OECD countries, the budget surplus in percent of GDP seems to be 
unrelated to the output gap, whereas there is a clear negative relationship between these variables in non-OECD 
countries, despite the presence of automatic stabilisers in the dependent variable (note, this difference might be 
due to differences in the size of automatic stabilisers for the two groups, since we expect automatic stabilisers to 
have a stronger effect on overall fiscal policy in the OECD countries). Looking at revenue, we find solid 
evidence of a more procyclical pattern of government revenue in non-OECD countries than in OECD countries. 
Hence the procyclical pattern for the surplus in non-OECD countries stems from the revenue side.  
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(8). The coefficient on posgap d OECD⋅ ⋅  is positive in all cases and statistically significant in 
all other columns than (5) and (7). The coefficient on (1 )posgap d OECD⋅ − ⋅ , on the other  
[Table 5 about here] 
hand, has an alternating sign and is never statistically significant. We are able to reject a null 
hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal against a one-sided alternative (again, with the 
exception of columns (5) and  (7)). Hence, the data suggest that government spending 
policies are procyclical in good times in OECD countries. There is no solid evidence of the 
same procyclical pattern in bad times. This confirms the results from the OECD sample. A 
similar asymmetry does not seem to be present in non-OECD countries. The coefficients on 
posgap d nonOECD⋅ ⋅  and (1 )posgap d nonOECD⋅ − ⋅  are never statistically significant and we 
fail to reject the hypothesis that they are equal in all cases.26 
6.3 Fiscal Policy and Voter Information 
In Table 6 columns (9) and (10) we interact the Shi and Svensson (2006) indicator, INFO, 
with the output gap in good and bad times to explore the effect of voter information on the 
cyclicality of government spending. INFO is highly correlated with the dummy variable for 
OECD countries, with a correlation coefficient of 0.54. Thus, to obtain reliable estimates of 
the effect of increased media access we must control for OECD membership, since we have 
seen that the cyclical pattern of fiscal pattern is very different in OECD countries than in non-
                                                 
26 The results for the budget surplus are very similar to the ones for spending. We do not find any solid 
evidence of an asymmetric cyclical pattern in government revenue, neither among OECD countries, nor among 
non-OECD countries. It is worth noting, however, that there are weak signs of a negative relationship between 
government revenue and the output gap in bad times in non-OECD countries. Thus, the negative relationship 
between the surplus to GDP ratio and the output gap in this group of countries (see note 25) seems to work 
through the revenue side of the government budget in bad times, rather than the expenditure side in good times. 
  
32 
 
OECD countries.27 This involves a great number of interaction terms with the output gap.  At 
the same time, the inclusion of INFO means that the number of observations available for 
analysis falls. Combining these two things, we fear that we may be stretching the data too far 
and we therefore choose to omit time dummies in order to restore degrees of freedom. The 
OLS estimates in column (9) and the GMMSYS estimates in column (10) both suggest that 
high-information countries run less procyclical spending policies in good times. The effect of 
a higher value of INFO is quite large and statistically significant at the five percent level in 
both cases. There does  
[Table 6 about here] 
not seem to be a similar effect in bad times, at least not of the same magnitude. Further, the 
positive coefficients on posgap d nonOECD⋅ ⋅  indicate that low-information countries among 
the non-OECD members also run procyclical spending policies in good times.28 
A final note concerns the role of voter information versus the role of corruption. Alesina, 
Campante and Tabellini (2008) find evidence that fiscal policy is more procyclical in 
countries with widespread corruption. In column (11) of Table 6 we confirm this finding, 
using the same control of corruption measure as Alesina, Campante and Tabellini.29 
However, the results in column (12) show that the significant sign on the control of 
corruption measure vanishes when we also control for voter information. The effect of INFO 
is largely unaffected by the inclusion of control of corruption and still significant in good 
times. These observations are consistent with the argument of this paper: a higher degree of 
                                                 
27 We have also tried running estimations with INFO included without controlling for OECD membership. 
The results were similar to the results in section 6.2, with INFO playing the same role as OECD did in section 
6.2. We suspect that this merely reflects the strong correlation between INFO and OECD, rather than a true 
causal effect of INFO. 
28 As a robustness check we included terms of trade as exogenous variable as done in e.g. Gavin and Perotti 
(1997). All our main results were roughly unaffected. 
29 See Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006) for details on the World Bank corruption measure.  
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voter information reduces the scope for corruption and thereby also reduces the degree of 
procyclicality. 
7     Interpreting the Results 
Panel A in Figure 2 illustrates the impact of output fluctuations on the level of government 
spending in a typical OECD country, based on the coefficients reported in Table 2. The figure 
is constructed such that an output gap equal to zero corresponds to a neutral effect on 
government spending. The picture drawn here is in many ways reminiscent of figure 1, which 
illustrated the profile of government spending according to the model that we presented in 
section 2: fiscal policy is more or less acyclical when the output gap is negative, but reacts 
procyclically to changes in income when the output gap is positive. Panel A shows a level 
drop in government spending at a zero output gap in OECD countries, which we do not 
model theoretically, but this is quite small and statistically insignificant.30 We interpret the 
similarity between the two figures as evidence in favour of our theory of fiscal policy. In 
advanced economies, such as the OECD countries, a strong economy does in fact seem to 
generate spending pressures that intensify as the output gap increases further. The same 
dependency between fiscal policy and output is absent in bad times. 
The asymmetric spending pattern found for the group of OECD member states does not 
apply directly to a broader sample of countries. The econometric analyses in section 6 shed 
some light on the differences between the highly developed group of OECD countries versus 
the heterogeneous group of non-OECD countries. The results are illustrated in panel B in 
Figure 2. For the OECD countries, we confirm the results from section 5: fiscal policy is 
                                                 
30 In estimations not reported, we tested out the level difference between good and bad times. Doing so pulls 
the positive coefficient in good times closer to zero. However, the coefficients are still large, positive and clearly 
significant. 
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procyclical in good times but not in bad times. The picture is slightly more blurred in the 
group of non-OECD countries, where government spending does not appear to react to 
fluctuations in output. However, in results not reported we 
[Figure 2 about here] 
find some evidence on the revenue side of the government budget, which indicate that fiscal 
policy is more procyclical in bad times in this group of countries. 
These differences lead us to believe that we need two different explanations for the 
occurrence of procyclical fiscal policies, depending on which group of countries we consider. 
For the middle- and low income countries in the group of non-OECD members, our results 
are consistent with Gavin and Perotti’s (1997) explanation of procyclical fiscal policiy: when 
the economy hits a slump, falling government revenue may necessitate a procyclical fiscal 
contraction due to binding credit constraints. Fiscal policy is therefore likely to become 
procyclical in bad times. In the high income OECD member states, on the other hand, 
governments are not credit constrained, and the above-mentioned explanation cannot account 
for the occurrence of procyclical fiscal policies among these countries. Instead, the model 
presented in this paper can explain the observed pattern of government spending in OECD 
countries.  
An interesting question is then, why the same spending pattern appears to be absent (or at 
least not very strong) among the non-OECD countries in good times. A natural point to make 
here is that the average quality of democracy among the OECD countries is higher than in the 
remainder of countries in the broad country sample. Unless the populations in less democratic 
countries have some alternative means of holding the incumbent accountable (such as revolts 
or strikes), we expect spending pressures to have limited impact on actual spending policies 
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in countries where the political accountability mechanism imposed by the electoral process is 
not as strong as in mature democracies. 
We find that in good times both a higher degree of fiscal transparency and voter 
information decrease the procyclical bias found in government spending. This is in nice 
accordance with our theory and it confirms that what is important is the ability of the 
electorate to monitor the actions of the incumbent. This can come about through a higher 
degree of fiscal transparency, but also through a free and active press that facilitates the 
propagation of information about fiscal policy to the public.  
8     Conclusions 
Procyclical fiscal policies occur in OECD countries as well as in less advanced economies. 
However, the exact way in which the procyclical patterns occur differs between these groups 
of countries. In OECD countries we find a strong asymmetry between good and bad times. A 
procyclical fiscal policy is a phenomenon that is typically associated with times of economic 
prosperity in these advanced economies. During times of economic slowdown, on the other 
hand, fiscal policy is typically acyclical or countercyclical. Matters are different in less 
advanced economies where procyclicality is a phenomenon that is more likely to occur in bad 
times.  
This paper offers a novel explanation of these observations by highlighting the role of 
fiscal transparency: a lack of fiscal transparency gives scope for rent seeking behaviour in 
fiscal policymaking. In times of economic slowdown or moderate economic activity, voters 
can restrain such rent seeking behaviour by conditioning re-election of the politicians holding 
office on observed performance. However, when the economy is booming it becomes easier 
for politicians to extract rents. The abundance of resources provides the incumbent with a 
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temptation that is too great to resist. Fully aware of this change in circumstances, voters 
increase their consumption demands in good times. Voters not only tolerate, but actually 
demand a seemingly suboptimal procyclical fiscal policy in good times. These demands are 
not a result of irrational or myopic thinking. Rather, the strategy of the voters ensures a 
second-best solution to the fiscal policy problem. 
This argument can explain why fiscal policy is more procyclical in good times than in bad 
times in advanced economies. However, it cannot explain why the opposite would be true, 
i.e. that fiscal policy is more procyclical in bad times than in good times, as is the typical case 
in middle- and low-income countries. This is in line with the borrowing constraints 
hypothesis, as proposed by Gavin and Perotti (1997). 
Our model of fiscal policy also generates an original auxiliary prediction: the procyclical 
bias in good times should be less severe in countries where fiscal transparency is high, since a 
transparent budget practice alleviates the moral hazard problem between voters and 
politicians by improving voters’ ability to monitor the actions of their elected representatives. 
We find empirical evidence in support of this prediction in OECD countries as well as in a 
broader sample of countries: better access to information about government policies does 
reduce the procyclical bias in government spending in good times.  
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10     Appendix 
In this appendix we present the solution to the voters’ problem. We allow for the 
possibility that the maximum level of rents in option (iii) depends positively on the level of 
income, so that t tr r yγ≤ + , where 0γ ≥ . Rent collection in period 2 now becomes 
2 2r r yγ= + , and consumption in period 2 is given by ( )2 2 2 1½ (1 ) (1 )g c y d rγ ρ= = − − + − .  
Turning to period 1, the expected discounted values of political rents in the three options 
become * * * 11 1 2(1 ) ( )V y g d r yτ ρ γ−= − + + + + , * * 12 1 2(1 )(1 ) ( )V y g d p r yτ ρ γ−= − + + − + +  
and 3 1V r yγ= + , respectively. The voters’ problem is then to choose values of *g , *τ  and *d  
so as to maximize their utility given in (1), subject  to the constraints 1 2V V≥ , 1 3V V≥ , *d d≤  
and the expressions for 2c  and 2g  given above. Rearranging the two incentive constraints 
and using (1 ) 1β ρ+ = , we can write the Lagrangian for this problem as 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1* 1 **1
1 2
* * * * *
1 2 2 1 1 2 3
(1 ) ½((1 ) )
2
1 1 1
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
y y d rgL
d d p r y g d y r y y d d
θ θθτ γ ββθ θ θ
λ β γ λ τ β γ β λ
− −−−− − − −= + + ⋅− − −
− − − + − − − + − + − − −
 
 
The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions are then given by 
 
( )
( )
*
1 2*
*
2*
2 1 2 3*
0 (1 )
0
0
L y
L g
g
L c
d
θ
θ
θ
τ λτ
λ
λ λ λ
−
−
−
∂ = ⇔ − =∂
∂ = ⇔ =∂
∂ = ⇔ = + +∂
 
 
 
and the complementary slackness conditions are 
*
1 2 1
* * *
2 1 1 2 2
*
3 3
( ) 0 , 0
(1 ) ( ) 0 , 0
0, 0
d d p r y
g d y r y y
d d
λ β γ λ
λ τ β γ β λ
λ λ
⎡ ⎤− − + = ≥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− − + − + − = ≥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− = ≥⎣ ⎦
 
 
We are mainly interested in situations where the constraint *d d≤  is unbinding. A binding 
borrowing constraint would give rise to a procyclical fiscal policy as originally described by 
Gavin and Perotti (1997). Since that is not our focus in this paper, we assume for now that  
*d d<  in optimum and that 3λ  is zero. We shall later derive a condition on the time profile 
of output that ensures that this is satisfied. 
As explained in the text, the constraint 1 3V V≥  must be satisfied with equality in optimum, 
so that * * * 1 1 2(1 ) ( ) 0g d y r y yτ β γ β− − + − + − = . Thus, we are left with two possible cases: 
Case 1): 1 0λ =  (the constraint 1 2V V≥  is unbinding). Combining the Kuhn-Tucker first-
order conditions with the complementary slackness conditions then gives * *1 2(1 )y g cτ− = = . 
Using (1 )t t tc yτ= − , 1 3V V=  and the expressions for 2c  and 2g  given above, we then get 
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the solution candidate 
( ) ( )
( )
1*
2 1 2
* 1
1 2
* 1 2
1
1 (1 )( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 ) / 2
(1 )1
2(1 )
d y y r y
g y y r
y y r
y
β β γ β γ
β γ β
γ βτ β
−
−
= + − − − +
= + − + −
− + −= − +
 (A.1) 
The solution candidates for political rents and consumption in period 2 can then be found 
by substituting these expressions into the government budget constraint and 
( )2 2 2 1½ (1 ) (1 )g c y d rγ ρ= = − − + − . For (A.1) to be a solution candidate, we must at the 
same time ensure that the constraint 1 2V V≥  is indeed satisfied. This implies that (A.1) is only 
a solution candidate if 
( )* 2 1 2 21 1( ) (1 ) ( )1d d p r y y y p r y d
ββ γ β β γγ β
⎛ ⎞+≥ − + ⇔ ≤ + + − + −⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠  (A.2)
Case 2): 1 0λ >  (the constraint 1 2V V≥  is binding). We now have 1 2V V= , 1 3V V=  and 
* *
1(1 )y gτ− = , where the latter equation follows from the first-order conditions. This is three 
equations in the three unknowns, *g , *τ and *d . Solving these three equations yields the 
solution candidate 
( )
*
2
*
1 2
* 1 2
1
( )
(1 ) (1 (1 ) ) (1 ) / 2
(1 ) (1 (1 ) ) (1 )1
2
d d p r y
g y d p r p y
y d p r p y
y
β γ
γ β γ β
γ β γ βτ
= − +
= − + − − − + −
− + − − − + −= −
 
(A.3) 
Political rents and period 2 consumption levels can again be found from the government 
budget constraint and the expression ( )2 2 2 1(1 ) (1 ) / 2g c y d rγ ρ= = − − + − . 
We must now determine which of the two candidates is the actual solution. First, note that 
if the condition in (A.2) is not satisfied case 1) does not deliver any solution candidate. 
Hence, in this situation case 2) gives a unique solution candidate and, given the concavity of 
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the objective function, this must then be the solution. On the other hand, if (A.2) is in fact 
satisfied, then the solution candidate in case 1) is the actual solution. This can be seen by 
noting that government consumption in case 1) is in each period a weighted average of the 
case 2) levels of government consumption in period 1 and period 2. The same is true for 
private consumption. The concavity of the utility function then implies that the case 1) 
candidate yields higher utility than the case 2) candidate. 
To sum up, whenever the condition in (A.2) is satisfied, the solution to the voters’ problem 
is given by the expressions in (A.1). Whenever (A.2) is not satisfied, the solution is given by 
the expressions in (A.3). Setting 0γ =  and using the formulations for 1y  and 2y  given in (4), 
we then get the solution presented in the text. The main difference between the solution with 
0γ =  and the more general case presented here is that a change in the time profile of output 
that leaves the present discounted value of total output unchanged is no longer neutral for 
consumption in case 1) when 0γ > . A PDV-neutral shift of output towards period 1 now 
lowers both types of consumption in both periods. The reason is that such a shift makes 
option (iii) more attractive to the incumbent, because more rents could now be collected in 
period 1. At the same time, fewer rents can be collected in period 2, which lowers the value 
of re-election to the incumbent. To keep the incumbent from choosing option (iii) voters must 
therefore moderate their demands for consumption. This effect vanishes when 0γ = . 
The main results of the model still hold with 0γ > , however: When output is low there is 
full consumption smoothing and marginal increases in period 1 output are spread out equally 
over the two periods via a lower budget deficit. When period 1 output becomes sufficiently 
high, however, further increases are transmitted into higher consumption in period 1 only, 
consumption smoothing breaks down and fiscal policy becomes procyclical. A higher degree 
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of fiscal transparency allows a higher level of period 1 output before consumption smoothing 
breaks down, and thus reduces the procyclical bias in good times. 
It remains to make sure that the upper bound on the deficit is not violated in equilibrium. It 
is clear from (A.3) that *d d≤  is always satisfied in case 2). From (A.1) we can find the 
appropriate condition in case 1) as ( )1 11 2(1 ) (1 (1 )) (1 )y y r dγ γ β β β β− −≥ − − + − − + .  
Note that this cut-off is always below the cut-off value given in (A.2) as long as 0p > . We 
implicitly assume that the condition here is always satisfied. A violation of this condition 
would imply a binding credit constraint in period 1. Fiscal policy would be procyclical, but 
for reasons that are entirely different than the ones that we focus on in this paper. 
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Figure 1. The reaction of government consumption to a positive output shock 
 
Figure 2: The impact of output fluctuations on government spending 
 
A: OECD sample - Profile of  Gov. Spending B: Broad Sample- Profile of  Gov. Spending 
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Notes:   
(1)  The graphs in Panel A are based on estimation results from Table 2, columns(4)-(6) 
(2) The graphs in Panel B are based on estimation results from Table 6, column (8) 
Table 1: Theoretical predictions about the effect of output fluctuations on fiscal policy 
Expenditure Revenue Surplus Expenditure Revenue Surplus
 + / - -+ + 0 +Good times
Total Effect Discretionary Response
0 + + 0 + +
Predicted effect of an 
increase in the level of 
economic activity
Bad times
 
Note: “Total Effect” is the sum of an automatic effect and the discretionary response. The 
automatic effect is the effect that would occur in the absence of changes to the tax rate and the level of 
government consumption. 
1g  
ε?  ε  
1
2
 
Panel B: High transparency 
ε?
1g  
ε  
1
2
 
Panel A: Low transparency 
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Table 2: Asymmetric Response of the Spending Side of the Government Budget, OECD countries 1989-2003 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variab le: Cur. Dis. / pot GDP Cons / pot. GDP Wage Cons. / pot GDP Soc.Sec. / pot GDP
Estimation method: OLS-IV Within-IV GMMSYS OLS-IV Within-IV GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS
0.053 0.018 0.019
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
0.799*** 0.990*** 0.2678*** 0.200*** 0.135*** 0.125*** 0.078*
 (0.25) (0.38) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
0.036 -0.069 0.023 -0.021 0.082*** 0.067*** -0.092***
(0.06)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
-1.478 -1.48 -0.428 -0.241 -0.255 -0.156** -0.220**
(0.73) (0.93) (0.22) (0.19) (0.12) (0.06) (0.11)
Time dummies: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of observations 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 244 257
- - -
- - -
gap i,t
----- Cyc. Adj. Current Disbursements excl. interest as percentage of potential GDP -----
- - -
- - -- - - -
,
pos
i td
,
pos
i tgap d⋅
,(1 )
pos
i tgap d⋅ −
 
Notes:   
(1) *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
(2) The following control variables are included in all columns: lagged dependent variable, inflation rate, NAIRU, public debt in previous year, 
election year dummy, log of trend income, sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP and demographic dependency ratio. A time 
invariant dummy for majoritarian electoral system is included in columns (1) and (4).  
(3) For OLS and Within estimations all output gap variables are instrumented with their one time lagged level value. 
(4) GMMSYS uses level lags from 2 to 12 of the lagged dependent variable in its differenced equation. In this equation the output gap variables 
are instrumented using their own two times lagged level values. For the level equation of GMMSYS the lagged dependent variable as well 
as the output gap variables are instrumented by their own one time lagged differenced values. 
(5) In no case, except for Social Security Benefits, did the m2 test for no second order autocorrelation in the differenced equation reject. Since 
the m3 test for no third order autocorrelation did not reject we used the level lags 3 to 12 as instruments of the lagged dependent variable 
for Social Security Benefits. 
(6) Columns (7) to (10) only show results using the GMMSYS estimator, however, the results using OSL and Within are roughly the same and 
are thus omitted. 
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Table 3: Interacting the output gap with single fiscal transparency dummies, OECD countries 1989-2003 
Dependent Variable:
Estimation method: 
GMMSYS
Time dummies:
Controls
No of observations 257 257 257 257257 223 257 257257 257 257 257
Yes Yes Yes YesYes Yes Yes YesYes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes YesYes Yes Yes YesYes Yes Yes Yes
+
* *** * *
+ + - ++ + - +
Sign on transparency 
dummy interacted 
with negative output 
gap
+ + +
-
** *** *** *** *
- + + -+ - - +
Sign on transparency 
dummy interacted 
with positive output 
gap
- - -
Whether the 
budget 
discusses the 
impact that 
variations in the 
key economic 
assumptions 
would have on 
the budget 
outturn (yes = 
transparent)
Whether the 
government 
regularly 
produces a 
report on the 
long term (10-
40 years) 
outlook for 
public finances 
as a whole (yes 
= transparent)
Whether the 
government is 
required to 
make regular 
actuarial 
estimates for 
social security 
programs (yes 
= transparent)
Whether the 
government is 
required to 
report 
contingent 
liabilities on a 
regular basis 
(yes = 
transparent)
(12)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cyc. Adj. Cur. Dis. excl. interests / pot. GDP ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accrual 
accounting (yes 
= transparent)
Whether the 
government 
generally 
presents more 
than one 
supplementary 
budget to the 
legislature in 
each fiscal year 
(no = 
transparent)
Whether non-
financial 
performance 
data is routinely 
included in the 
budget 
documentation 
presented to 
the legislature 
(yes = 
transparent)
Whether there 
is a legal 
requirement 
that the budget 
documentation 
contain a 
projection of 
expenditure 
beyond the next 
fiscal year (yes 
= transparent)
Whether it is a 
legal require-
ment that the 
budget include 
an ex post 
comparison 
between 
projected 
expenditure in 
future years 
and the actual 
expenditures in 
those years 
(yes = 
transparent)
Whether the in-
year financial 
reports are 
audited (yes = 
transparent)
Whether 
special reports 
on the fiscal 
outlook are 
released prior 
to an election 
(yes = 
transparent)
Whether the 
economic 
assumptions 
used in the 
budget are 
subject to 
independent 
review (yes = 
transparent)
(8) (9) (10) (11)(4) (5) (6) (7)(1) (2) (3)
 
Notes:  
(1) *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
(2) GMMSYS uses level lags from 2 to 12 of the lagged dependent variable in its differenced equation.  In the difference equation the 
output gap variables are instrumented using their own two times lagged level values. For the level equation of GMMSYS the 
lagged dependent variable as well as the output gap variables are instrumented by their own one time lagged differenced values.  
(3) The m2 test was performed for all estimations and in no case was the validity of the instruments rejected. 
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Table 4: Interacting the output gap with transparency, OECD countries 1989-2003 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variable:
Estimation method: GMMSYS
0.322*** 0.396*** 0.373*** 0.418*** 0.248*** 0.278*** 0.196*** 0.201*** 0.157* 0.164**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.07)
-0.289*** -0.29*** -0.325*** -0.312*** -0.163*** -0.147*** -0.079*** -0.071*** -0.114* -0.129**
(0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
-0.029* -0.055*** -0.030*** -0.021*** -0.019
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
0.066*** 0.065*** 0.050*** 0.031*** 0.006
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.046** -0.067*** -0.036*** -0.023*** -0.024
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
0.081*** 0.073*** 0.056*** 0.034*** 0.011
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.219 -0.268 -0.081 -0.129 -0.172 -0.229* -0.158*** -0.179*** -0.197** -0.206**
(0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09)
Time dummies: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of observations 257 257 257 257 257 257 244 244 257 257
Cyc Adj Cur Disb / pot. GDP Wage cons / pot. GDP
-
-
-
-
Cur Disb / pot. GDP Cons / pot. GDP
-
Soc Sec / pot. GDP
- - - -
-
- - -
-
- - -
- --
, ,
pos
i t i tgap d⋅
, ,(1 )
pos
i t i tgap d⋅ −
,
pos
i td
11
, ,
pos
i i t i ttransp gap d⋅ ⋅
11
, ,(1 )
pos
i i t i ttransp gap d⋅ ⋅ −
10
, ,
pos
i i t i ttransp gap d⋅ ⋅
10
, ,(1 )
pos
i i t i ttransp gap d⋅ ⋅ −
 
Notes:   
(1) See notes (1) to (5) in Table 2.  
(2) transp11 is the aggregation of the dummies in Table 3 (except for question 6). 
(3) transp10 is transp11 without question 9 from  Table 3. 
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Table 5: Central government expenditure and the output gap, Persson and Tabellini country sample, 1980-98 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variab le
Estimation method OLS-IV Within-IV GMMSYS OLS-IV OLS-IV Within-IV GMMSYS
0.275 0.284* 0.050
(0.170)  (0.156) (0.057)   
0.574 0.558* 0.902 0.013
(0.455)  (0.292) (0.673)  (0.113)
0.318 0.064 0.164 0.135
(0.382)  (0.190)  (0.629)  (0.141)
-1.377 -2.103 -0.156
(2.188)  (3.225)  (0.374)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control variab les included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 934 939 939 934 934 939 939
- - -
     ------------------------  Central government expenditure in percent of GDP  ----------------------------
-gap i,t
-
--
- -
-
-
- -
-
,
pos
i td
, ,
pos
i t i tgap d⋅
, ,(1 )
pos
i t i tgap d⋅ −
 
Notes:   
(1) *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
(2) The following control variables are included in all columns: lagged dependent variable, inflation rate, election year dummy, log of trend 
income, sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP and demographic dependency ratio. The OLS estimations include time invariant 
dummy variables for the electoral system and democracy which limits the sample size. 
(3) For OLS and Within estimations all output gap variables are instrumented with their one time lagged level value. 
(4) GMMSYS uses level lags from 2 to 12 of the lagged dependent variable in its differenced equation. In this equation the output gap 
variables are instrumented using their own two times lagged level values. For the level equation of GMMSYS the lagged dependent 
variable as well as the output gap variables are instrumented by their own one time lagged differenced values. 
(5) The m2 test was performed in each of the GMM estimations and in no case was the validity of the instruments rejected. 
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Table 6:  Expenditure reactions in OECD versus non-OECD countries and effect of voter information, Persson and Tabellini country sample 1980-98 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variab le
Estimation method OLS-IV Within-IV GMMSYS OLS-IV Within-IV Within-IV GMMSYS GMMSYS OLS-IV GMMSYS GMMSYS GMMSYS
0.689*** 0.429** 0.009 - - - - - - - - -
(0.194) (0.219) (0.118)
0.139 0.235 0.028 - - - - - - - - -
(0.192)  (0.185) (0.059)
- - - 2.724*** 5.582 1.797*** 0.231 0.337** 2.835*** 0.685* 0.507*** 0.718*
(0.93) (5.11) (0.65) (0.18)  (0.17) (1.06) (0.37) (0.16) (0.38)
- - - 1.005 4.206 -1.424 -0.03 -0.359 0.965 -0.376 -0.185 -0.413
(0.76) (6.82) (0.91) (0.20)  (0.23) (1.28) (0.31) (0.20) (0.28)
- - - -5.571* -18.98 - -0.547 -0.407 -4.038 -0.066 -0.291 0.3963
(2.98) (22.66) (0.61)  (0.54) (3.65) (0.55) (0.48) (0.51)
- - - 0.252 0.639 0.514 -0.014 0.030 0.504 0.251* -0.018 0.150
(0.44) (0.75) (0.54) (0.17)  (0.15) (0.50) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
- - - 0.402 -0.416 -0.111 -0.014 0.032 0.266 0.099 0.075 0.083
(0.39) (0.96) (0.51) (0.15)  (0.16) (0.49) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
- - - -1.427 0.562 - 0.392 -0.142 -1.180 -0.028 0.022 0.268
(2.56) (4.89) (0.80)  (0.78) (3.23) (0.71) (0.62) (0.62)
- - - - - - - - -0.937** -0.597** - -0.558**
(0.48) (0.25) (0.26)
- - - - - - - - -0.197 -0.170 - -0.077
(0.65) (0.24) (0.23)
- - - - - - - - - - -0.141** -0.094
(0.07) (0.07)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
Control variab les included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 934 939 939 934 939 939 939 939 768 768 891 743
OECD i  = nonOECD i 2.052 0.693 -0.148 - - - - - - - - -
[0.020]** [0.244] [0.559]
- - - 2.605 0.486 2.175 1.152 2.637 - - - -
[0.00]*** [0.31] [0.01]** [0.12] [0.00]***
- - - -0.354 1.004 0.631 -0.003 0.009 - - - -
[0.64] [0.16] [0.26] [0.50] [0.50]
gap i,t  OECD i
gap i,t  nonOECD i
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Central gov. expenditure in % of GDP  ------------------------------------------------------------------------
,
pos
ii td OECD⋅
, ,
pos
i t ii tgap d OECD⋅ ⋅
, ,(1 )
pos
i t ii tgap d OECD⋅ − ⋅
,
pos
ii td nonOECD⋅
, ,
pos
i t ii tgap d nonOECD⋅ ⋅
, ,(1 )
pos
i t ii tgap d nonOECD⋅ − ⋅
, ,, ,: (1 )
pos pos
i t i ti t i tnonOECD gap d gap d⋅ = ⋅ −
, ,, ,: (1 )
pos pos
i t i ti t i tOECD gap d gap d⋅ = ⋅ −
, ,,
pos
i t i ti tgap d INFO⋅ ⋅
, ,,(1 )
pos
i t i ti tgap d INFO⋅ − ⋅
,i t igap Corruption⋅
 
Notes:   
(1) See Table 5.  
(2) Test for nonOECD vs. OECD  and gap·d pos vs. gap·(1-d pos)  are all one-sided t-tests. 
 
